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You might not want to read something this long, but I figured it wouldn't hurt to post it. If you're into history, you might like it. My history prof sure did. Got me a B+ on it. If you read my .50 caliber essay a couple months ago, this one is similar in style. This is a history paper though, not on a contemporary argumentative topic like gun control. This paper basically gives the war aims of Germany in the invasion of Russia in both world wars.
The War Aims of the Imperials and Nazis on the Russian Front
The period in German history from 1914 to 1945 was dramatic. The years from 1914 through 1919 marked the downfall of three powerful families. Europe politically gave way to the modern world, shedding her aristocratic veneer. This would be known as The Great War in its time and World War I in ours. Twenty years later, Adolf Hitler would start a war with Europe the likes of which the world had never seen. This war was World War II. In both of these wars, the Russians played an integral part. Both times they were formidable foes to the German Army. The question remains as to what exactly Germany wanted to gain from the Russian war. I will explore the various aims of the Imperial and Nazi armies by examining the theorists who have written about them.
The army of Imperial Germany invaded Russia in order to colonize the land for resources and defend themselves from the Russian “Steamroller”. The army of Nazi Germany invaded, influenced by ideology and the need for resources. In both cases, resources were an issue, but ideology played a much more important role in Hitler’s invasion. Self defense played a more important role to the Imperials.
Part I – The Imperials and the Great War’s Eastern Front
When Keiser Wilhelm approved an agreement between Germany and Austria-Hungary, he did not realize the devastating outcome. This agreement, known as “The Blank Check” for the power it gave to Austria Hungary, was Germany’s ticket to war. The result was the July Ultimatum, an unreasonable list of demands set before the Serbian government that is often seen as a casus belli on the part of the Austro-Hungarians. The literal sequence of events is clear: the archduke was shot, Germany supported Austria, Austria went to war with Serbia over the Ultimatum, Russia declared war on both Germany and Austria-Hungary as she was allied with Serbia, France declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary because she was allied with Russia, Germany marched on Belgium to get to France, protecting Belgium, Britain declared war on Germany and Austria-Hungary. In 1905, General Alfred Graf von Schlieffen drew a plan which was used by Germany nine years later. The plan called for a lightning fast attack on the western country of France by way of Belgium. Von Schlieffen said, "Let the last man on the right brush the Channel with his sleeve," meaning, follow an arching curve downward parallel to the English Channel. This was to prevent a two-front war with both the western powers and Russia, or “The Russian Steamroller,” as she was called. Ultimately, the plan did not work and Russia mobilized much faster than the Germans had anticipated, squeezing them in with a two-front war; the very thing The Schlieffen Plan was supposed to guard against. Germany was now involved with a brutal war against Russia.
When Fritz Fischer wrote Griff nach der Weltmacht, the main source for his thesis, that the war was a result of Germany’s desire to expand and become a world power, was the September Programme. The September Programme, written by German chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg in 1914, laid out Germany’s war aims as a list, separated by country. Russia is mentioned in section 5 of the document, “The Question of Colonial Acquisitions, where the first aim is the creation of a continuous Central African colonial empire, will be considered later, as will that of the aims to be realized vis-à-vis Russia.” Fischer also drew on Heinrich Class’ 1914 document Memorandum on German War Aims, in which Class agreed with The September Programme. Fischer noted, “As regards the east, Class wrote that ‘Russia’s face must be forcibly turned back to the east and her frontiers must be reduced, approximately, to those of Peter the Great.’” The territory Class spoke of included the Russian Baltic provinces, parts of Poland, and the entirety of Lithuania. According to Fischer, both Hollweg and Class had the aim of “weakening of Russia and ‘security’ for Germany.” Center Party politician Matthias Erzberger also drafted a memorandum on the war aims of Germany. The memorandum was separated into three main goals that were in turn heavily summarized; the second of which was “the shattering of the Russian colossus.” Fischer noted that Erzberger desired the “liberation of the non-Russian peoples ‘from the Muscovite yoke’ under German military supreme control.” Erzberger’s requirements were even more ambitious than Class’ and included the acquisition of the entire Kingdom of Poland. Powerful and influential industrialist August Thyssen also drew up a memorandum on the subject of German war aims. His was an ambitious plan which included the acquisition of “the Baltic provinces and perhaps the Don Basin with Odessa, the Crimea, the Lvov area and the Caucuses,” and “a land-bridge across south Russia, Asia Minor and Persia.” This was to be able to hold an offensive against India, the colony of the British Empire, the “real enemy in this war.” Thyssen supported these goals by stating Germany’s need for raw materials . This succession of politicians and businessmen, Bethmann Hollweg, Class, Erzberger, and Thyssen, respectively more extreme in their goals, all supported the theory that the acquisition of land for colonization was a major war aim for Germany. Fischer used these memoranda to make his famous claim that Germany started World War I in the hopes of becoming a world power.
Prominent French theorist Gabriel Hanotaux noted on German war aims, “Every one knows that the essential reason for the present war is the determination of the German Empire to secure food and welfare for all its subjects by winning world-wide markets for German labour [sic] and its products. This is the policy which I began calling the policy of the stomach, and which has made the German race fling itself upon the world like a pack of starved wolves.” Indeed, resources were important for Germany. Eric Maria Remarque notes several times in All Quiet on the Western Front that after several years of fighting, the only food that got to the soldiers in the trenches was turnip bread, turnips being one of the only readily available foodstuffs after the excesses of war .
French philosopher Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, notable in his studies in primitive mentality, shared a similar opinion with Hanotaux and Fischer. He states that Germany did not have the security of African colonies to produce resources like Britain, Denmark, Holland, and France did, and that colonization was an important driving factor for Germany. He wrote, “If Germany possessed great and wealthy colonies, they would no doubt furnish her with safe and permanent markets, and she would have steady and regular commercial intercourse with them, like England, France, and Holland… She suffers from a lack as if she had been used unjustly, and her dull resentment has probably contributed indirectly to urge her along the path of military and naval preparation… She has asked herself what was the use of her military supremacy if it could not secure her the markets which were indispensable to her commerce.” Indeed Lévy-Bruhl’s expertise on primitive mentality is not wasted here, as German leaders clearly showed a deep psychological need for conformity with other European nations, as well as the security and resources of colonies.
If colonization was one major war aim, self defense was certainly another. Hollweg noted in July 1914 that “If Russia was to protect Serbia, better then than later.” German diplomat Gottlieb von Jagow parroted this with, “If war had to come, then in view of Russia’s attitude, it would be better then than later.” These statements reflect the assumption that Russia would not mobilize as fast as they did. The same can be inferred from the Schlieffen Plan, which relied on a much longer period of mobilization in Russia. The only reason Hollweg and Jagow would state this is if they thought Russia would be starting unprepared, and the ‘desire’ to fight Russia at that particular moment was strategic.
Another piece of evidence that supports the notion that self-defense was a major war aim for Germany came in a collection of telegrams titled Germany’s Reasons for War with Russia. In the telegram from the Berlin Foreign Office in August 1914, Germany defends Austria-Hungary’s aggressive diplomacy with Russia as “Justifiable self defense.” The Foreign Office clearly reasoned that Austria-Hungary was the one being abused by Croatia.
From the telegram, “We could not, however, in these vital interests of Austria-Hungary, which were at stake, advise our ally to take a yielding attitude not compatible with his dignity, nor deny him our assistance in these trying days. We could do this all the less as our own interests were menaced through the continued Serb agitation. If the Serbs continued with the aid of Russia and France to menace the existence of Austria-Hungary, the gradual collapse of Austria and the subjection of all the Slavs under one Russian sceptre [sic] would be the consequence.”
From this document also comes the assumption that Germany had a reason to be angry with Russia, and it would not be inaccurate to assume that, even though small, vengeance might have subconsciously been a war aim for Germany. It is interesting to note that “On July 27th the Russian Secretary of War, M. Ssuchomlinof, gave the German military attaché his word of honor that no order to mobilize had been issued, merely preparations were being made, but not a horse mustered nor reserved called in… under no circumstances those situated on the German frontier, i.e. St. Petersburg, Vilna, and Warsaw… In the succeeding days news concerning Russian mobilization came at a rapid rate. Among it was also the news about preparations on the German-Russian frontier.” This could be interpreted in a couple of ways. It could be seen as an unofficial comment made between two officials, in which case Russia as a whole would not be at fault. Or it could be seen as Russian strategy to catch the Germans off-guard when Russia did in fact mobilize against Germany, which is the most likely case. Either way, Germany cited this transaction in the White Book and used it as part of her official excuse for war with Russia.
In short, the main German war aims in Russia were these: colonization of Russian provinces for the acquisition of raw materials and defense against Russian mobilization. In March of 1918, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed by the new Bolshevik government and the Eastern front was closed. After a long and hard-fought victory for Germany in the Eastern Front, the war was almost over. The failure of the Schlieffen Plan to prevent the dreaded two-front war resulted in defeat for Germany. The victory in the east came too late for the German Army to gain anything from it, other than the transfer of much-needed troops to the west. This was enough to mount an offensive in France, but by May, over 500 thousand troops from The American Expeditionary Force had come to the aid of the Allies. The war was lost for the Central Powers despite the victory in Russia.
Part II – The Nazis and Operation Barbarossa
After the seizure of Poland, the fertile ground to the north, as part of his plan for Lebensraum, after the easy annexation of Austria, the invasion of France, and the bombardment of England, Hitler was willing to flex his military might even further. Continental Europe stretched westward only so far, and the only direction left to go was east. Soviet Russia, the enemy of Aryanism, was to be Hitler’s ultimate triumph after a plethora of military victory. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, the document ensuring Nazi-Soviet non-aggression, was shattered on June 22, 1941. To Nazi Germany, it was called Barbarossa, to Soviet Russia, “The Great Patriotic War.” No matter the name, what we know for certain is that the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany was the single deadliest military operation in world history. The combined results of Hitler and Stalin’s brutality resulted in tens of millions of deaths. The end result was a hard-fought victory for the Soviets, who pushed the Germans back from within 20 miles of Moscow to 150 miles westward, encircled them, and slaughtered them. But as with the Imperial Germans, one of the pressing questions is about what Germany was planning to gain from this operation in the first place. The war aims of Nazi Germany remain debated by historians in the intentionalist and functionalist camps, but the best answer may lie between the two theories.
One should note that the Nazis were not aiming to fight a limited war with Russia. If Hitler was going to commit to such an ambitious operation, he would want to take it as far as he could, and then some. Historian Alexander Dallin wrote, “In formulating plans for Russia’s future, Nazi Germany rejected from the outset the traditional concept of a ‘limited war,’ the restriction of war aims to the acquisition of a certain territory… while recognizing the enemy as a legitimate member of the family of nations and without striving to change the political, social, and ideological bases of the enemy state.” Hitler wanted the destruction of the Soviet Union. Based in ideology, Hitler called for the eradication of ‘Jewish bolshevism.’ “The most obvious political end was the eradication of the Soviet regime by German force,” wrote Dallin. However, to obtain this goal, Hitler was given options. After victory, he could either admit the Russian people to become part of his so-called ‘New Order,’ or he could wait and determine their fate after the overthrow of bolshevism.
An official document citing war aims in Russia, Guidelines in Special Fields Concerning Directive No. 21, went over what was planned with Russia after the German victory, including dividing the entire Soviet Union into several small states with their own governments. Mentioned in the document is the importance of setting up “socialist state structures” within the states so that they would be dependant on Germany. The importance of the ideological overhang of Barbarossa is mentioned as well. The document tells of a “struggle between two ideologies” and backs up Dallin’s claim that Hitler believed the “Jewish-Bolshevik intelligentsia, as the oppressor of the past, must be liquidated.”
An excerpt from a document from a German field Marshall to the invading Army states, “The most essential aim of war against the Jewish-Bolshevistic system is a complete destruction of their means of power and the elimination of Asiatic influence from the European culture… The soldier in the Eastern territories is not merely a fighter according to the rules of the art of war but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted upon German and racially related nations.” This document goes on to discuss revenge on ‘subhuman Jewry’ and states the degenerate nature of the Soviet prisoners of war, relegating them to subhuman status as well. Any notion of humanitarianism towards the Soviet prisoners of war and civilians is passed off as unpatriotic, clearly stressing the ideological war aims of Barbarossa.
As with any war, the question of resources and labor is an issue. The war was taking a massive toll on Germany economically. German soldiers were leaving to fight the war and creating shortages in domestic labor. Volunteers for the countries occupied by Germany, French POWs, and workers from various other countries were being used in an attempt to close the gap in the labor market. Although this helped, it was not enough compared to the millions of men Germany had conscripted to the Wehrmacht. The German young people and women employed in the Soldiers’ stead demanded wages that were too high for the already stretched war economy. Shortages of raw materials were also a problem for the Nazis. Labor shortages from the departed soldiers left coal mining understaffed and the production was slowed. Because of this shortage of a vital fuel, iron and steel production was devastated. The importation of Swedish mined ore and nickel from Norway was halted due to military operations in the Baltic. These problems translated into war aims against the Soviet Union. The idea of invading Russia had been brewing in Hitler’s mind long before Barbarossa or the treaty. Historian Barton Whaley wrote, “Russia had been on Hitler’s agenda of conquest since he wrote Mein Kampf in 1924. The vast lands and grains and natural resources of Russia formed the coveted heart of the territorial Lebensraum that Hitler dreamed would someday be the empire of the Thousand Year Reich.” Of course, the Nazis did not anticipate the slow and painful nature of the battle, instead anticipating another blitzkrieg victory the likes of which were seen in Poland and France. They almost got their lightning victory, which proves that the plan was not totally unreasonable, but were bogged down by the Soviet winter and got pushed back by Zhukov.
Wrote historian Rolf-Dieter Müller, “German leadership regarded the potential danger to ore deliveries as so great that it warranted putting the navy on the offensive against the Soviet-Baltic Fleet. Hitler repeatedly intervened in the direction of operations to press for the rapid occupation of Leningrad, which would safeguard the supply of iron ore from Sweden.” The Soviet Union was also looked upon in the issue of food shortages. “It appeared that the imminent decline in German war production, and the placing of extra burdens on the population, could be avoided only by making full use of Soviet raw materials and foodstuffs.” Also, under an agreement made while on ‘peaceful’ terms with Stalin, half of Poland was occupied by the Russians. Germany had control of the favored western half of Poland, but the resources, crops, and useable lands of eastern Poland were also to be desired.
Hitler had in mind an armaments program planned for post-war Russia the likes of which had never been seen. The need for resources was definitely there, but the drive was powered by ideology. Hitler had planned to use a projected Russian ‘supplementary area’ as a colonial economy. According to Müller, “Behind such plans lurked the traditional German goal of achieving world-power status. It was to be attained by the creation of an autarchic continental empire, which would stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals and be secure against blockade... these economic ideas had become inextricably entwined both with Hitler’s plans for racial and ideological annihilation, and with the apparent inherent necessities of the war economy.” Hitler planned to use the plundered resources to expand the Luftwaffe, the tank program, and the entire German munitions industry in general in this ambitious armaments program.
Historian Woodruff D. Smith wrote that Hitler’s foreign policy goals were separated into three “stages.” The first stage focused on Germany’s independence from the crippling blow dealt by the Versailles treaty, and featured Germany’s rearmament and withdrawal from the League of Nations. The second stage focused on the acquisition of Lebensraum. The third, Weltpolitik stage focused on the strengthening of German industry and the establishment of colonies in Africa under the name Mittelafrika. Russia is dealt with in the second stage. On the issue of Russia, Smith wrote, “Ultimately, the achievement of Lebensraum in the second stage meant destroying the Soviet Union and totally defeating France… neither economic autarchy nor an adequate amount of living space – even for short-term purposes – could be attained without seizing a substantial amount of Russia… It was the next ‘logical’ consequence of the successful pursuit of German aims up to 1941.” Of the stages, the second is the one most based in ideology. The strive for independence and the colonial establishment of resources are things that any country would attempt. The implications of ‘living space,’ however, are more centered on ideology. Hence, Smith’s thesis on Germany’s war aims in Russia is that they were ideological.
The goals of the Nazi army were these: the ideological elimination of the Bolshevik ideal from Russia, the territorial drive for Lebensraum, and the acquisition of resources. These goals contrast with the Imperials, whose intentions of self-defense and colonization seem almost innocent. Unlike the Imperials, the Nazis did not win their war with Russia. They were pushed back and encircled, losing millions of men. Hitler’s vice-grip on his war aims did not loosen. Hitler refused to accept anything less than German victory. Historian Norman Rich wrote, “Military and political disasters had no effect on Hitler’s war aims. Throughout the Russian campaign he stated and restated the same objectives with minor variations and embellishments. A speech to army group commanders in July 1943 might have been delivered in July 1941 – or in 1924.” Hitler’s mania increased throughout the European campaign, along with his overconfidence and cruelty. By the time of the Russian arrival in Berlin, Hitler had ordered the destruction of Germany. The world would never be the same.
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